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Congress and the Question of Most Favored Nation
Status for the People's Republic of China

Eugene A. Theroux*

Background

The Congress of the United States merits special attention in any historical or
prospective assessment of United States trade with China. The American
embargo on trade with China, only recently relaxed, was based on Acts of
Congress,1 and removal of a principal remaining impediment to normal trade
* J.D. Georgetown University Law Center, Of Counsel to the law firm of Baker
& McKenzie, Washington, D.C. The author, then Special Counsel to the Joint
Economic Committee of the United States Congress, was legal aide to the mission of
House Majority Leader Hale Boggs and House Minority Leader Gerald Ford to the
People's Republic of China during June and July, 1972. He returned to China in a
private capacity in May and October 1973.
1. Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917, 12 U.S.C. § 95(a) (1970). The Act
empowers the President "during the time of war or during any other period of national emergency declared by the President" to regulate or prohibit commercial or
financial transactions "by any person, or with respect to any property, subject to the
jurisdiction of the United States" with regard to "any foreign country or national
thereof." Under this act, President Truman on December 17, 1950, prohibited all
commercial and financial transactions with Communist China.
Export-Import Bank Act of 1945, as amended, 12 U.S.C. § 635(b)(2)(A) (1970).
The Act states that the Bank shall not guarantee, insure, or extend credit, or participate in any extension of credit in connection with the purchase or lease of any
product by "a Communist country" as defined in the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961,
or in connection with the purchase or lease of any product by any other foreign
country if the product in question is principally for use in, or sale or lease to "a
Communist country." Exceptions to this ban may be made if the President determines them to be in the national interest; he must report that determination within
30 days to both Houses of Congress.
Export Control Act of 1949, 50 U.S.C. App. §§ 2401 et seq. (1970). The Act declares that it is the policy of the United States to apply export controls to "Communist-dominated nations" to the "maximum extent possible" in cooperation with
U.S. allies and non-Communist nations. (Superseded by the Export Administration
Act of 1969.)
Mutual Defense Assistance Control Act of 1951 (Battle Act), 22 U.S.C. §§ 161113(d)

(1970).

Congress ".

.

. declares it to be the policy of the United States to

apply an embargo on the shipment of arms, ammunition, implements of war, atomic
energy materials, petroleum, transportation materials of strategic value and items of
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relations-lack of most-favored-nation treatment for China's exports to the
United States requires Congressional action. Moreover, there resides in the
Congress substantial power to affect the future of Sino-American commercial
relations by additional legislation or through the use of nonstatutory pressures by the Executive Branch.
After the first American vessel, The Empress of China, anchored at Canton in 1784, the ship reported to the Continental Congress of Chinese enthusiasm at the prospect of trade, concluding that "[t]o every lover of his country, as well as those more immediately concerned in commerce, it must be
primary strategic significance used in the production of arms, ammunition, and implements of war to any nation or combination of nations threatening the security of the
United States, including the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and all countries under
the domination. . .

."

The Act empowers the Executive to determine items to be em-

bargoed and that such determination "shall be continuously adjusted to current conditions . . ."

It further states that upon the recommendation of the Administrator, all military
economic, or financial assistance to any nation be terminated if that nation knowingly
permits the shipment "to any nation or combination of nations threatening the security
of the United States" of arms, ammunition, implements of war, atomic energy materials, petroleum, transportation materials of strategic value and "items of primary
strategic significance used in the production of arms, ammunition, and implements of
war." The President, however, may disregard the recommendation of the Administrator if he determines that a termination of such assistance would be detrimental to the
security of the United States.
The Act further declares it to be the policy of the United States to regulate the export of commodities other than those specified by the Act with regard to nations or
combination of nations threatening the security of the United States.
The President is directed to invite nonrecipients of American aid to cooperate in
controlling the exportation of strategic commodities to any nation or combination of
nations threatening the security of the United States.
Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1951, 19 U.S.C. § 1351 (1970). The Act
denies most-favored-nation status to all Communist countries except Yugoslavia and
specifically prohibits the importation into the United States of certain furs and skins
from Communist China. (Superseded by the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, 19
U.S.C. § 1801 (1970). See note 31 infra.
Mutual Security Act of 1954, 22 U.S.C. § 1934(a) (1970). Congress authorizes the
President to control the export and import of arms, ammunition, and implement of
war, including technical data relating thereto. The President is authorized to designate those articles which shall be considered as arms, ammunition, and implements of
war, including technical data relating thereto. (Section 414.)
Trade Expansion Act of 1962, 19 U.S.C. § 1861 (1970). The Act directs the President to "suspend, withdraw, or prevent the application" of the most-favored-nation
tariff treatment to products, imported directly or indirectly, of any country or area
"dominated or controlled by Communism." The President may extend the benefits of
trade agreement concessions to products, imported directly or indirectly, of a Communist country, which was receiving trade concessions at the time of enactment of the
Act, upon determination that such treatment would be in the national interest and
would promote the independence of such country or area "from domination or control
by international communism."
Export Administration Act of 1969, 50 U.S.C. App. § 2401(2) (Supp. III 1973).
The Act declares that it is the policy of the United States to restrict the export of goods
and technology which would make a significant contribution to the military potential
of any other nation or nations which would prove detrimental to the national security
of the United States.
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a pleasing reflection that a communication is thus happily opened between
us and the eastern extreme of the globe." 2 The second law enacted by
the first United States Congress, the Tariff Act of 1789, sought inter alia to
protect American commerce with China by imposing a discriminatory duty on
tea and other goods imported in non-U.S. vessels, and American merchants
petitioned Congress for aid in expansion and protection of that trade. 3
The first American treaty with China was negotiated for the United
States by Caleb Cushing, a former Member of Congress from Massachusetts.
Dispatched by President Tyler with elaborate instructions from Secretary of
State Daniel Webster, Cushing concluded the treaty at Wanghia, a suburb of
Macao, on July 3, 1844. Among the instructions he followed successfully was
an injunction to secure most-favored-nation treatment for the United
4
States.
China's early experience with the "preferred" or "most-favored-nation"
principle was bitter. The clause in the Treaty of 1844 gave the United States
equal access to the same "treaty ports" and other concessions the British had
won in the Treaty of Nanking two years earlier. 5 By its terms, the clause also
guaranteed to the United States automatically the same rights or privileges
China might thereafter extend to any nation. The provision was unilateral.
Benefits extended by China to the United States were not only not reciprocated by the United States, but American "exclusion laws" of a later period
were, in a sense, to accord "least favored" status on the Chinese.
As Great Britain, France, Germany, Russia, Portugal and Japan forcibly wrested concessions from a hapless and weakened China, all benefited
from a similar provision. China's ability to resist extending further privileges declined rapidly as one nation after another wrung from her benefits
thus secured by all others. The most-favored-nation concessions granted by
China in 1842, almost as much as the military superiority of her adversaries,
sapped her power and will to resist the foreign predators.
Victimized by unequal treaties, bewildered by mercantilism, behind in
2. Diplomatic Correspondence of the U.S., 1783-1789, 767, quoted by J.W. FosTER in AMERICAN DIPLOMACY IN THE ORIENT, 27-28 (1903).
3. Id. at 38; HISTORY OF THE COMMITTEE ON FINANCE,

S. Doc. No. 91-57, 91st
Cong., 2d Sess. (1970).
4. S. Doc. No. 138, 28th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1843).
5. Treaty Between the United States of America and China, July 3, 1844, art. II,
8 Stat. 592 (1848), T.S. No. 45.
Citizens of the United States resorting to China for the purpose of Commerce . . . shall, in no case, be subject to higher duties than are or shall be
required of the people of any nation whatever ....

And if additional ad-

vantages or privileges, of whatever description, be conceded hereafter by
China to any other nation, the United States, and the citizens thereof, shall
be entitled thereupon, to a complete, and equal, and impartial participation in
the same. 8 Stat. 592; T.S. 45.
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military tactics and naval armaments, infected by opium, corrupted with
bribes and demoralized over foreign encroachment in her cities and over
her commerce, China in the 19th century virtually surrendered her sovereignty to her "most-favored-nations." 6
Bilateral most-favored-nation status eventually did become a part of
U.S.-China trade relations. It was made a part of the Treaty of Friendship,
Commerce and Navigation concluded between the United States and the
Republic of China in 1946, though the ink on that treaty was barely dry
before the Nationalist government was overthrown and driven from the
mainland by Communist forces. Should the United States accord recognition
to the Government of the People's Republic of China, however, neither
country would succeed to the benefits of the 1946 treaty.
In the period following Chiang Kai-shek's defeat, the United States sought
to strangle China with a trade quarantine as comprehensive as may be found
7
in the annals of international commercial relations.
Relaxation of the United States embargo on China trade was begun in July
of 1969, when President Nixon eased restrictions on American travel to China
and permitted limited import of Chinese goods.8 Thereafter, the United
States permitted its flag vessels or aircraft to carry Chinese cargo between
non-Chinese ports,0 placed the Peoples Republic of China in country group
"Y" of the Commodity Control List maintained by the Office of Export Control of the Department of Commerce' ° and allowed American aircraft and
6. "Whether in commercial and economic matters, or in purely political and
administrative relations, the Powers have not hesitated to employ the most-favorednation clause as a convenient tool in extracting special privileges from China. The
most-favored-nation doctrine, whose ordinary purport is to insure against inequality and
discrimination among nations, has thus degenerated into a mere pretext with which the
principal Powers in China have and still do endeavor to establish their special provisions as against their rivals, utterly disregarding the interests of the territorial
Power." T Sze, China and the Most Favored Nation Clause, 1925 (unpublished
doctoral dissertation, Columbia University, New York). Sze's study is an excellent
chronicle of the political and economic penetration of Imperial China.
7. Recent studies of the U.S. trade embargo on China include Redick, Recent
Changes in United States Trade Regulations Affecting the People's Republic of
China: A Market Decontrolled, 13 VA. J. INT'L L. 78 (1972); Metzger, Administrative
Survey: 1971, (People's Republic of China), 4 LAW AND POL. IN INT'L Bus. 308, 404
(1972); Lee & McCobb, United States Trade Embargo on China, 1949-1970: Legal
Status and Future Prospects, 4 N.Y.U.J. INT'L & POL. 1 (1971); Garson, The American Trade Embargo Against China, CHINA TRADE PROSPECTS AND UNITED STATES
POLICY (Eckstein ed. 1970); Garson, The American Trade Embargo of China: Recent
Developments, 2 J. MAR. L. & CoM. 41 (1970).
8. Each tourist is permitted to import $100 worth of Chinese goods as accompanying baggage for noncommercial purposes. 34 Fed. Reg. 12179 (1969). Visas for
visitors from the Peoples Republic of China are to be expedited. 7 Weekly Pres.
Docs. 628 (1971).
9. 7 Weekly Pres. Docs. 628 (1971).
10. 8 Weekly Pres. Docs. 438-39 (1972). Prior to the February 14, 1972 decision, the general license list for the PRC involved some 75-80 percent of the products
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ships to call at Chinese ports."'
The distance the two nations have come toward normalized trade relations,
however, dramatizes a remaining major obstacle to American-Chinese

trade-the lack of most-favored-nation treatment for Chinese exports to
the United States.
U.S. Policy and the Most FavoredNation Clause
The most-favored-nation

clause

is intended to eliminate discriminatory

treatment in the international exchange of goods. The clause obligates a
country to extend it to its contracting party all concessions which are accorded the goods of any other state. 12

In this respect, the clause is an

important tool in the fostering of international trade.
The most-favored-nation concept has always been a cornerstone of
American trade policy.'i
A wide variation in the form of the clause as

used by the United States, however, reflects a flexible negotiating posture
fashioned to serve varying economic and political interests. 1 4 In 1923,
the United States departed from its usual practice of granting only conditional
most-favored-nation treatment.' 5 This change occurred after the United
approved for export to the Soviet Union. Locomotives, construction equipment, internal combustion engines, industrial chemicals and rolling mills are some of the
products which have newly been made available for trade. See Starr, Developing
Trade with China, 13 VA. J. INT'L. L. 13 (1972).
11. American firms are now permitted to fuel Chinese ships and aircraft not
bound for North Vietnam, North Korea, or Cuba. See White House announcement,
November 22, 1972, and Department of Commerce and Department of Transportation
press releases of Nov. 22, 1972; relating to modification of Transportation Order T-2.
12. Of all the definitions of most-favored-nation treatment, the most comprehensive provides as follows: "A most-favored-nation clause is a provision, generally
inserted in a commercial agreement between two states, which obligates the contracting
parties to extend all concessions or favors made by each in the past, or which might
be made in the future, to the articles, agents, or instruments of commerce of any other
state in such a way that their mutual trade will never be on a less favorable basis
than is enjoyed by that state whose commercial relations with each is on the most
favorable basis."

SNYDER, THE MOST-FAvoRED-NATION CLAUSE 10 (1948).

For an

interesting study on the history of the most-favored-nation provision, and its GATI
application, see Executive Branch GATT Study No. 9, The Most-Favored-Nation Provision, Sen. Comm. on Finance, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., Committee Print, July 1973.
13. In 1968, the United States had entered into Most-Favored-Nation agreements
with 102 countries.
14. In his 1948 monograph, note 12 supra, Snyder, described the basic forms of
the most-favored-nation clause in five categories: (1) conditional and unconditional,
(2) unilateral or mutual, (3) limited or unlimited, (4) positive or negative, and
(5) simple or complex. These terms may be explained by applying them to the first
most-favored-nation provision negotiated by the United States with China. See note 5
supra. This provision was unconditional, since any concessions granted to another
country on a like product were to be immediately applicable to the contracting party;
the provision was unilateral since the United States was not bound to give most-favorednation treatment to China. Not confined to a list of enumerated items, the provision
was negative in phrasing and simple in plan.
15. An example of the conditional pledge will best explain its use. If countries A

1973]

Most Favored Nation Status

States had experienced difficulty in negotiating agreements with the conditional clause and a consequent fear of discrimination against American goods
in international commerce. 6 With adoption of the unconditional form of
the clause, the United States was better equipped to safeguard her trade.
In 1934, the Congress voted to give the equivalent of most-favored-nation
treatment to all countries with respect to duties and other import restrictions on foreign goods. 17 While the President was given authority to suspend the benefits in the event of discrimination against American commerce,' 8 the United States adopted the most-favored-nation measure unilaterally, as a gesture of good will and in the expectation that increased foreign commerce would benefit the domestic economy. In 1948, the United
States joined the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GAIT),
thereby obligating itself to grant to all Contracting Parties "any advantage, favor, privilege or immunity" which had been given to any one of the parties, a broader commitment than that contained in the 1934 Act. 1 9
In addition to the multilateral commitment embodied in GATT, the
United States initiated an ambitious program of bilateral agreements in the
form of the treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation. These treaties
applied both the national treatment and most-favored-nation standards to a
number of specific tariff and non-tariff trade problems. For the past two
decades, the Friendship, Commerce Navigation treaty has been the basic
instrument for establishing commercial relations with non-Communist coun20
tries.
and B enjoyed a particular tariff rate with the United States, and A negotiated a
lower rate in exchange for a comparable reduction in its tariff on an American product,
B would not obtain the lower tariff rate until B had given the United States a concession comparable to the one given by A.
The chief argument against the conditional form was that it was unfair that a country could be in a position to claim without compensation concessions which other
countries have secured only by giving concessions in return. The United States used
the conditional form beginning with a treaty with France in 1778. See Crandall, The
American Construction of the Most-Favored-Nation Clause, 7 AM. J. INT'l L. 708
(1913).
16. HORNBECK, THE MOST-FAvORED-NATION CLAUSE IN COMMERCIAL TREATIES 124 (1900).

J. VINER, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS 106 (1951).

The first agreement to

conclude the new form was an executive agreement concluded with Brazil in 1923.
T.S. 672. This was followed in 1925 by a Friendship, Commerce and Navigation
Treaty with Germany. 44 Stat. § 132, T.S. 725. The United States has consistently
used the unconditional clause in numerous agreements since 1923. See, generally,
Catudal, The Most-Favored-Nation Clause and the Courts, 35 AM. J. INT'L L. 41, 42
(1941).
17. Congress amended the Tariff Act of 1930, 48 Stat. 943 (1934), codified at 19
U.S.C. § 1351 (1970).
18. Id.
19. See Espiell, The Most-Favored-Nation Clause; Its Present Significance in GATT,
5 J. WORLD TRADE L. 29, 34 (1971).
20. For a useful collection of materials on the Friendship, Commerce & Navigation
Treaty, see Metzger, 1 L. INT'L TRADE 126 (1966).
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Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1951
With the advent of the Cold War, Congress employed most-favored-nation
status as a political tool. Until 1951, the United States had continuously
followed a trade policy since the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934
under which the United States extended unconditional and unlimited mostfavored-nation treatment to all foreign imports whether or not it had a trade
21
agreement with the exporting country.
On February 7, 1951, Representative John Byrnes of Wisconsin offered
an amendment to the Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1951, H.R. 1612,
providing inter alia that within 90 days "the President shall . . . withdraw or prevent the application of reduced tariffs or other concessions...
to imports from any nation or area . . dominated or controlled by the foreign government or foreign organization controlling the world Communist
22
movement."
Byrnes advanced two principal grounds for his amendment: first, that
the United States should not grant trade concessions to countries opposing
the United States in Korea and, second, that Communist countries by their
economic nature could not reciprocate such concessions. On the first
point, Byrnes cited Soviet sale of furs to the U.S. in order to earn "dollars with
which to purchase strategic items elsewhere" for use in Korea. On the second, he said that in 1949, 76 percent of China's exports to the United
States had benefited from most-favored-nation duty rates even though the
United States had no trade agreement with the Peoples Republic of China
and enjoyed no benefits in return. Despite some political discussion, most
House Members who expressed a view favored the Byrnes amendment
on protectionist grounds, holding that goods of Communist countries were
produced by slave-labor yielding low-priced items with which the U.S.
28
could not compete.
In his explanation of H.R. 1612 to the Senate, Senator George pointed out
that his Finance Committee had unanimously broadened the Byrnes amendment to make it retrospective as well as prospective. 24 The House and
21. For a discussion of the 1934 Act, see COMMITTEE ON FINANCE, S. REP. No. 871,
73d Cong., 2d Sess. 18-19.
22. 97 Cong. Rec. 1065 (1951) (remarks of Mr. Byrnes).
23. One speaker, Representative Short of Missouri, said he would oppose the trade
bill altogether because it was a transfer of Congressional authority to the Executive.
American trade policy, he said, had for too long been "maneuvered, manipulated and
concocted by long-haired men and short-haired women in the State Department." He
said he recognized that other countries must sell to the United States if they are to
buy from the United States, but that he far preferred to help "my next door neighbor
in Missouri" rather than "the coolie in China, the peon in Mexico or the hottentot
from Zanzibar to Zamboanga." 97 Cong. Rec. 1067 (1951) (Remark of Mr. Shorr).
24. 97 Cong. Rec. 5491 (1951) (remarks of Mr. George).
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Sentate versions went to a Conference Committee, and the Conference Report
was approved by the Senate on May 29, 1951, and by the House on June 5,
1951.25
As finally enacted, Section 5 of the Trade Agreements Extension Act of
1951 provided in pertinent part:
As soon as practicable, the President shall take such action as is
necessary to suspend, withdraw or prevent the application of any
reduction in any rate of duty .. . or other concession . . .to

imports from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and to imports
from any nation or area dominated or controlled by the foreign
organization controlling the world Comgovernment or foreign
26
munist movement.
Section 11 of the Act, added by the Senate, provided that the President
also take necessary measures to prevent the importation of certain Chinese27
produced furs.
Other Senate amendments, to which the House agreed in Conference, provided that the President need act only when such action was "practicable." These amendments deleted the House requirement that the President
act within 90 days and, in addition, gave the Chief Executive the authority to
restore most-favored-nation status to "countries which appear to be throw'2 8
ing off the yoke of communism."
In June, 1951, Representative Cleveland Bailey of West Virginia called
upon the President to use his authority under the 1951 Act to revoke trade
concessions to China. Bailey called for formal notice to China that her ex-

ports to the United States would no longer be entitled to most-favored-nation
tariff treatment. He cited a statement by the National Labor-Management Council on Foreign Trade Policy that while China in 1950 abrogated the
1947 Geneva multilateral trade agreement, the cancellation did not technically prevent her from enjoying, under the most-favored-nation clause,
tariff reductions made by the United States with third countries. 29 President
Truman issued a Proclamation on August 4th, 1951, carrying into effect the
mandate of the Act with respect to imports from Communist nation
80
and areas.
25. 97 Cong. Rec. 5951 (1951); H.R. REP. No. 537, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1951).
26. Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1951, § 1362, ch. 141, § 5,65 Stat. 73
(1951), as amended 19 U.S.C. § 1362 (1970).
27. 19 U.S.C. § 1360 (1970).
REP. No. 33, 82 Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1951); H.R. Rep. No. 537. 82d Cong., 1st
28. S.

Sess. 5 (1951).
29. 97 Cong. Rec. A4188 (1951) (remarks of Hon. Bailey).
30. Proclamation No. 2935, Aug. 4, 1951, 16 FED. REG. 7635, 65 Stat. p. c. 25;
1951 U.S. Code Cong. and Admin. News Vol. 1, p.922.
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Trade Expansion Act of 1962
Major trade legislation enacted in 1962 continued the policy of the 1951 Act,
though section 5 of the 1951 Act was repealed and superceded. While section 251 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 generally provided most-favored-nation tariff treatment "to the products of all foreign countries," section
231 of that Act continued the political use of most-favored-nation status with
respect to Communist countries directed the President "as soon as practicable" to:
suspend, withdraw or prevent the application of the reduction,
elimination or continuance. . . of any existing duty-free or excise
treatment . . . to products, whether imported directly or indi-

rectly, of 1 any country or area dominated or controlled by Communism.8
Under section 231 of the House bill, most-favored-nation treatment would
have been denied to the products of all Communist countries including Poland and Yugoslavia, which had received most-favored-nation benefits in
1960.82 The Senate Finance Committee sought to permit the President, in
his discretion, to continue most-favored-nation status for these countries by
reinstating, in substance, the language of the Trade Agreements Extension
Act of 1951. The terms of this act permitted the extension of most-favorednation treatment to the products of countries appearing to be achieving a
measure of independence of the world Communist movement. But even under
the Senate proposal, reduction in duty rates was to be expressly denied for imports from China.38 In Conference, however, the Senate receded from its position and the House version was retained in the final bill.8 4 Any part of
China "which may be under Communist domination or control" has been explicitly listed in the column 2, non-most-favored-nation duty rates.8 5
CongressionalRecommendations for Change
Since 1966, there have been a number of bills introduced in both the
Senate and the House seeking either to grant the President discretionary
31. 19 U.S.C. § 1861 (1970).
32. The Foreign Assistance Act of 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-205 § 402, 77 Stat. 390,
(1963) allowed Poland and Yugoslavia to retain the most-favored-nation status granted
by President Eisenhower prior to the Trade Expansion Act of 1962. The change permitted the President to extend most-favored-nation treatment to imports from Poland
and Yugoslavia "when he determines that such treatment would be important to the
national interest and would promote the independence of such country or area from
domination or control by international communism." 19 U.S.C. § 1861(b) (1970).
33. 1962 U.S. CODE CONO. ADMIN. NEWS, 3113, 3119 and 3124.
34. Conf. Report No. 2518, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 3033 (1962), to accompany H.R.
11970, Id. at 3135.
35. See General Headnotes and Rules of Interpretation, Tariff Schedules of the
United States Annotated § 3 (1972).
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authority to extend most-favored-nation treatment or legislating its extension
directly to a particular country.3 6 The Congressional climate which had been
growing more receptive to improved American trade relations with China
found its first expression in H.R. 10569, the "East-West Trade Relations
Act of 1969", legislation proposed by Representative Paul Findley of
Illinois, an active proponent of China trade.
The Findley bill was, in its sponsor's words, designed to permit the President "to extend the benefits of most-favored-nation tariff treatment to any
Communist country with which we maintain diplomatic relations and which
is a member of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade . . .and to
use trade with Communist countries to normalize relations with these countries.,,37
While Findley was concerned with a need for improved Sino-American
trade relations, his bill as written would not have permitted U.S. extension
of most-favored-nation status to China, which neither belonged to GATT nor
had diplomatic relations with the United States. In Findley's view, the
United States "would take an economic risk in carrying on commercial
relations with a state trading company of a country that is not a member
'3 8
of GATT.
Nevertheless, he reminded the House that withdrawal of most-favorednation status had occurred in 1951 and that, after 16 years, "it would make
good sense" for the President to have "the authority to extend the benefits of equal tariff treatment."3 9
Never passed, Findley's bill was reintroduced in substantially the same form
in the Sentate in 1971 as S. 2620, the "East-West Trade Relations Act of
1971." In an important change from the earlier version, the Senate bill
would not have limited the extension of most-favored-nation status to countries with which the United States had diplomatic relations. S.2620 would
have permitted a trade agreement containing a most-favored-nation provision to be concluded between the United States "and countries presently not
receiving most-favored-nation treatment." In other words, the Senate bill
36. H.R. 10077, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971); H.R. 16694, 92d Cong., 2d Sess.
(1972); H.R. 1076, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971); H.R. 10430, 92d Cong, 1st Sess.
(1971); H.R. 99676, 89th Cong,, 2d Sess. (1969); H.R. 11659, 88th Cong., Ist Sess.
(1966); S. 2283, 91st Cong., Ist Sess. (1969); S. 2620, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971);
S. 1389, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971). For a general discussion of these proposals, see
Malish, United States East European Trade, Staff Research Studies No. 4, United
States Tariff Commission 22-27.
37. 115 Cong. Rec. 10234-42 (1969) (remarks of Mister Findley).
38. Id. at 10235-36.
39. Id. at 10235-36.
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was designed to permit the extension of most-favored-nation treatment to
a country, like China, with which the U.S. did not have diplomatic relations.
Referring to such proposed legislation, Senator Abraham Ribicoff of Connecticut recommended passage of a statute permitting the extension of
most-favored-nation status to China in particular. Such legislation, he
said, would be "particularly timely in that it could give the President actual
authority to conclude a commercial agreement when he visits China." Senator Ribicoff emphasized that the "bill is drafted so that formal diplomatic
' 40
relations between the two countries need not precede such agreement."
The 92d Congress adjourned without taking any action which would have
permitted the extension of most-favored nation status to any Communist
country. As an indication of changing U.S. policy on the subject, however,
the United States and the Soviet Union entered into a comprehensive trade
agreement in October, 1972, which, subject to Congressional approval, extended most-favored-nation tariff treatment to Soviet exports to the United
41
States.
Title V of the "Trade Reform Act of 1973", H.R. 6767, submitted to the
93d Congress on April 10, 1973, would empower the President to conclude
a trade agreement extending most-favored-nation tariff treatment to China,
among other countries now subject to Column 2 rates of duty, subject to a
42
Congressional veto procedure.
Any United States trade agreement with China, under H.R. 6767, must
be limited to an initial period of not more that three years, and may be
renewable for additional periods, each not to exceed three years. The
President could at any time suspend or withdraw, in whole or in part, the
application of most-favored-nation treatment, and the bill also contains a
provision which would protect domestic industries from market disruption
caused by increased Chinese imports should China receive most-favorednation treatment under the proposal.
Section 706 of the measure would repeal the embargo contained in the
Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1951 on seven furs and skins from the
People's Republic of China, and the bill would also repeal Johnson Debt
Default Act.
Section 501 of the proposed bill would replace section 231 of the Trade
Expansion Act. Except as otherwise provided in the bill, however, mostfavored-nation treatment would continue to be denied to products imported
from any country or area subject to Column 2 rates of duty, and the
40. THE

ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES IN EAST-WEST TRADE,

REPORT TO THE COM-

92d Cong., 1st Sess., 1971.
41. White House Fact Sheet, Trade Agreement, Lend-Lease Settlement, Reciprocal
Credit Arrangements, Joint U.S.-U.S.S.R. Commercial Commission, October 18, 1972.
MITTEE ON FINANCE,

42. Title V of H.R. 6767. See Appendix I for full text.
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President would have the power to withdraw most-favored-nation treatment
from any country when he deems it necessary for national security reasons.
Section 502 would authorize the President to enter into a bilateral commercial agreement conferring most-favored-nation treatment to imports from
a country currently subject to Column 2 rates of duty, provided such an
agreement promotes the purpose of the legislation and is in the national
interest. This provision would apply to the October, 1972 agreement with
the Soviet Union.
Five provisions suggested for inclusion in bilateral commercial agreements
are enumerated in Section 503, but this Section does not inhibit the President's discretion to include additional commercial agreements. Most of the
suggested provisions are contained in the 1972 trade agreement with the
Soviet Union, and they may be indicative of provisions to be included in any
agreement eventually negotiated with China.
Section 504 of the bill would permit the President to extend most-favorednation treatment to imports not only from any country which has entered
into a bilateral commercial agreement which has entered into force under
Section 502, but also to any country which has become a party to an
appropriate multilateral trade agreement to which the United States is also
a party, such as the GATT. In both situations, the benefits would be
subject to a Congressional veto procedure set forth in Section 502(c). The
enjoyment of most-favored-nation treatment, however extended, could be
limited to the duration of the bilateral agreement or to the period both
countries are a party to a multilateral agreement.
Section 505 would establish more easily satisfied criteria for Tariff
Commission determination of whether injury to a domestic industry has
occurred due to imports from countries granted most-favored-nation treatment.
At this writing, it appears possible that Title V, made controversial by
the Congressional opposition to Soviet emigration policy, may be stripped
from H.R. 6767, in whole or in part, to expedite favorable committee action
and House consideration of the remainder of the bill. Should this occur, it
is likely that Title V would be reconsidered, essentially as written, but as
a separate bill.
Seeking to avert a situation in which a trade bill would be entirely silent
on the most-favored-nation question, two California members of the Ways
and Means Committee, Jerry L. Pettis (R-Calif) and James C. Corman (DCalif), proposed compromise language to the Committee on September
43
12, 1973.
43. See The Pettis-Corman formula, Appendix II.
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Considerationsin Extending Most-Favored-NationStatus
Does China Want Most Favored Nation Treatment From the United States?
While she has not formally sought most-favored-nation treatment for her
exports to the United States, it seems evident that China regards MFN status
as both politically and economically desirable. 44 A most-favored-nation
clause is ordinarily included in China's foreign trade agreements, 45 because the People's Republic can hardly be expected to have the capital necessary for the purchase of foreign goods if she is denied fair and meaningful opportunities to earn foreign exchange through the sale of her own exports. Moreover, in the Chinese view American denial of market access,
particularly now that most-favored-nation status become part of a U.S.U.S.S.R. trade agreement-is an unwarranted political discrimination hampering further normalization of relations and inconsistent with the agreement
by the United States in the Shaghai Communique to "facilitate the progressive
'40
development of trade between the two countries.
Without most-favored nation status from the United States, China is effectively barred from the world's largest market, a market from which
she could expect to earn some of the dollars necessary to purchase the
goods American entrepreneurs are so assiduously promoting. If allowed
to compete fairly with other exporters to the United States, it has been estimated that with improvements in styling, quality control and marketing tech44. In an informal exchange of views on trade relations generally, an official of
the China Council for the Promotion of International Trade in Peking told House Majority Leader Hale Boggs and the author in June, 1972, that "your tariff levies on our
goods are the highest possible. Remember, trade can only be developed in a favorable
political atmosphere." From author's notes.
45. A recent example is the trade agreement between the Peoples Republic of China
and the Republic of Italy, signed in Rome on October 27, 1971 and effective through December 31, 1974, whose Article 4 provides: "(1) Both contracting parties reciprocally
grant to each other the treatment of the most favored nation in the matter of customs
duties, additional taxes and every other charge, as well as in the matter of formalities,
regulations and customs procedures; (2) that provided the preceding paragraph is not applicable to: (a) advantages, favors, privileges and exemptions granted to, or to be
granted by each of the contracting parties to bordering countries (including border
traffic); (b) advantages, favors, privileges and exemptions granted, or to be granted by
each of the contracting parties to countries interested in present or future participation
in customs unions or similar institutions. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE (unofficial
translation). In a 1958 Treaty of Trade and Navigation between the PRC and
the U.S.S.R., the most-favored-nation provision stated simply, at Article 2: "The Contracting Parties shall grant to each other most-favoured-nation treatment in all matters
relating to trade, navigation and other economic relations between the two States."
152 UNITED NATiONS-TREATY SERIES, No. 4534 (1958). For a discussion of China's
ideological view and use of the most-favored-nation clause, see Hsiao, Communist
China's Trade Treaties and Agreements (1949-1964), 21 VA-D. L. R'v. 623, 643-44
(1968).
46. Shanghai Communique, 11 INT'L L. MATElUALS 443 (1972).
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niques, China could generate $300 million to $500 million in export earnings from sale to the United States of labor intensive manufactures. 47
Finally, the United States currently confers most-favored-nation status on
the Nationalist Government on Taiwan, a fact which not only places China
at a distinct economic disadvantage but which continues a diplomacy which
is a political affront to Peking.
State Tradingand the Reciprocity Problem
The quid pro quo which a country ordinarily receives for extending mostfavored-nation treatment-the return of equivalent treatment by its trading
partner-poses a special problem in trade with state trading economies.
While the most-favored-nation principle proposes equal access for all foreign
exporters to a domestic market, subject only to the forces of competition,
nonmarket economies lack the element of private market forces. Exporters
to state economies confront but one consumer-the government. In the
case of China, the Ministry of Trade may make its purchases on strictly
political rather than economic considerations, and rarely will the decisionmaking process be made public.
From 1965 to 1970, major American exports to China were machinery
and equipment, $395 million; iron and steel $390 million; crude material,
edible oils and fuels, $360 million; and grain $355 million. 48 Major imports from China were textiles, yarn and fabric, $340 million; animals, meats
and fish, $215 million, fruits and vegetables $170 million and clothing, $155
million.4 9 It is currently estimated that the 1973 volume of U.S.-China
trade will approach $900 million and, significantly, it is expected that some
$800 million or more will represent U.S. exports. This underscores the
Chinese need for more equitable access to the American market.
It has been estimated that the present import-export mix will continue
essentially unchanged until 1980, 50 though the volume of trade could
grow appreciably, depending upon the degree of China's interest in economic advancement and her ability to earn foreign exchange. 51 The dizzy47. Chen Kuan-I, The Outlook for China's Economy, 63

CURRENT HIsTORY

103,

107 (1972). Presently the American market for traditional Chinese exports is not
large. Dernberger, Prospects for Trade Between China And The United States, CHINA
TRADE PROSPECTS AND U.S. POLICY, supra, note 7, pp. 246-47; Perkins, Is There
A China Market?, 5 FOREIGN POLICY 102-03 (1971).
48.

JOINT ECONOMIC COMMiTTEE, THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA:

ASSESSMENT

An ECONOMIC

35 (1970).

49. Id.
50. DERNBERGER, Prospects for Trade Between China and the United States, CHINA
TRADE PROSPECTS AND U'S. POLICY 183, 224-28 (1970). See supra note 7.
51. Should China depart from present policy and develop tourist facilities, tourist
trade could become an important source of exchange earnings. Yugoslavia and
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ing prospect of some 800 million consumers, however, which has put
stars in the eyes of many American exporters, and the excitement of would-be
importers of irresistible bargains from the Middle Kingdom, must be seen
in light of the fact that the volume of American-Chinese trade has never
been great, and will likely grow very slowly. 52 This suggests that improved
trade relations, including the problem of reciprocity for most-favored-nation
status, are likely to be non-economic in the trade sense.
Many observers have argued that the influence of political factors in the
decision-making process of nonmarket economies has made the process
inherently discriminatory and that, as a result, the exchange of unlimited
most-favored-nation treatment between a capitalist country and a statetrading nation would be an unequal exchange. 58 In considering most-favored-nation status for China, then, both sides are likely to experience difficulty in negotiating a trade agreement if commercial factors alone are
54
contemplated.
One of the first comprehensive proposals for dealing with state trading
countries and the reciprocity problem was the "commercial considerations
clause."'55 This required the state economy to base its purchases of foreign
products exclusively on commercial considerations. Such a provision may
be found in Article 17 of GATT 50 and it has been used in the Treaty of
Hungary, for example, have enjoyed tremendous incresaes in tourism in the last decade.
See A Foreign Economic Policy for the 1970's, Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Foreign Economic Policy, Joint Economic Comm., 9th Cong., 2d Sess. 1215 (1970).
52. In 1900, the combined volume of imports and exports between the two countries totaled $42,000. DRISCOLL, Basic Data on the Economy of the People's Republic of China, OVERSEAS BUSINESS REPORTS 35, Dept. of Commerce (Sept. 1972)
[hereinafter cited as DRISCOLL]. This was approximately one percent of the total
U.S. overseas trade that year. China and the United States; Today and Yesterday,
Hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations Comm., 92d Cong., 2d Sess., 26
(1972). According to Driscoll, the largest amount of trade between the two countries occurred in 1946 when it reached $558,000. Since relaxation of the embargo,
trade has increased, the volume for the first quarter of 1972 being three times the
total volume of trade for the preceding year. DERNBERGER, supra note 47, estimates
that by 1980 the total volume of trade between the two countries could reach $1.7
billion for that year, or only .5% of U.S. Trade. Preliminary figures for 1972
U.S.-China trade by commodity and value appear in Trading with The Peoples Republic
of China, OVERSEAS BUSINESS REPORTS 73-16, Dep't. of Commerce (May 1973), at
20-23.
53. See Domke and Hazard, State Trading and the Most-Favored-Nation Clause,
52 AM. J. INT'L L. 55 (1958); VERBIT, TRADE AGREEMENTS FOR DEVELOPING CoUNTRIES 132 (1969).

54. See Berman, Legal Framework of Trade Between Planned and Market Economies: The Soviet-American Example, 24 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB.482, 499 (1959).
55. See Articles 29 and 30 of the Charter for an International Trade Organization,
U.N. Conference on Trade and Employment, Final Act and Related Documents, U.S.
State Department Publication 3206 (1948).
56. Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A3 (1947), T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187.
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Friendship, Commerce and Navigation between the United States and Japan. 7
As a practical matter, this provision cannot prevent discrimination which,
though evidentally political, has an economic basis.
Consideration of most-favored-nation status for China then, as with any
state economy, must take into account the very real question of what the
United States might obtain by way of quid pro quo. 58 China's assurance of
most-favored-nation treatment for U.S. exports, and related arrangements
designed to secure fair market access for American goods, are not the sole
benefits which should be sought by the United States in a trade agreement
with China. As a practical matter, the United States sould have something
more than marketing opportunities on a par with third countries since, as a
nonmarket economy, China cannot grant foreign goods the same benefits
as those enjoyed by her own. In addition, China is not a consumer society,
and thus the range of American exports marketable in China is limited.
This is not to say the United States should return to the predatory ways of a
19th century foreign trading nation, seeking reciprocity all out of proportion
to what is granted. Longstanding political and economic isolation affords
ample opportunities for reciprocal nontariff benefits which could and should
form a part of any trade agreement in which the United States extends
most-favored-nation status to China. Among these could be the settlement
of financial and property claims, both public and private;59 establishment
57. April 12, 1953 4 U.S.T. 2063 T.I.A.S. No. 2863.
58. The conditions for admission of Poland and Yugoslavia to the GATT suggest
that the GATT members felt there was a significant threat of discrimination in trade
agreements with state trading nations, and both were initially denied membership.
Yugoslavia was admitted in 1961 after having developed a provisional tariff applicable
to commercial imports, and Poland was accepted in 1967 after having offered to increase the total value of its imports by not less than seven percent per year. EVANS,
THE KENNEDY ROUND IN AMERICAN TRADE POLICY 104, 263 (1971).
59. On December 17, 1950, the United States froze Chinese assets in the U.S. in
the amount of $1.3 billion. This action was taken under the authority of the Foreign
Assets Control Regulations, 31 C.F.R. § 500.201 (1971). According to the U.S. Treasury Department, Office of Foreign Assets Control, the Chinese assets include $61.5
million in bullion, currency and deposits; $24.7 million in letters of credit; $5.2 million
in notes, drafts and debts maturing in one year; other property $496 million; financial
securities $24.5 million; interests of associated foreign persons $2.4 million; interests in
estates and trusts $348 million; real and personal property $6.5 million; and all other
property $4.4 million. In response to this action, China seized American property
which has since been found by the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission to be valued at $196,861,844. This figure includes 539 individual claims totalling $14,377,726;
44 corporate claims totalling $122,823,554; 82 claims of religious and non-profit organizations totalling $58,266,394; and 12 other claims totalling $1,394,170. See Blocked
Assets and Private Claims. The Initial Barriers to Trade Negotiations between the
United States and China, GAJ. INT'L & COMP. L. 449-55 (1973).
In addition to the private claims of American nationals against China, there are
United States Government claims amounting to some $67,000,000 arising out of loans,
credits and lend-lease to the Republic of China prior to 1949. See Delinquent International Debts Owed to the United States, Hearings Before the House Subcomm. on
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of trade and tourist promotion facilities and opportunities; exchange of trade
missions and expanded travel for commercial representatives; arrangements
for the settlement of commercial disputes, and for the protection of trademarks and industrial rights and processes; and arrangements for the creditfinancing of trade,60 among others.
In the past, the United States has used a number of devices to ensure reciprocal concessions in the granting of most-favored-nation status: (a)
A purchase commitment of a certain minimum value of goods annually.
In 1937, the United States extended most-favored-nation treatment to the
Soviet Union in exchange for a pledge to purchase at least $40 million
worth of goods the following year. 6 1 (b) An agreement to settle existing
financial claims. Poland agreed to settle $40 million in claims as part of
the consideration for most-favored-nation treatment in 1960.62 More recently, the Soviet Union agreed to settle $722 million in lend lease debts as
part of the trade agreement concluded in 1972.63 (c) Provisions against
patent and copyright infringement. These provisions are important in
dealing with state trading countries where the means of production are not
Government Operations, 92d Cong., 1st & 2d Sess., at 64, 68-69, 76, 99, 108 (197172). The records of the Import-Export Bank reflect a receivable in excess of $26
million for pre-1949 loans to the Nationalist Government. The Bank's records show
the obligation under the heading "China (Mainland)." Export-Import Bank of the
United States, Cumulative Record by Country, February 12, 1934 to June 30, 1971, p.
10. At a Senate hearing in 1964, a Bank official suggested this amount was payable
by the PRC despite the fact that Peking does not acknowledge the debt. East-West
Trade, Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 88th Cong., 2d Sess.,
pt.1, at 192, 199 (1964).
60. Under the provisions of the Johnson Debt Default Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 574,
18 U.S. Code 955, a foreign state is precluded from long-term loans or credits from
U.S. private institutions or public agencies so long as that government is in default of
debts owing to the United States. The Export-Import Bank, however, is not restricted
by this statute, and under the Export Expansion Finance Act of 1971, 85 Stat. 345,
12 U.S. Code 635, the President has discretionary authority in the national interest to
permit the Bank to provide credit or financing for U.S. exports to China. Neither
would the Johnson Debt Default Act deny such credits or loans to defaulting foreign
governments while any such government is a member of both the International Monetary Fund and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. Nor are
credit sales of agricultural commodities to defaulting nations prohibited if the credit
extended is within the range of customary practice for such commodities. 42 Op.
Att'y Gen. p.
(1963).
61. The commitment to purchase a specific quantity of goods has been used successfully. In October, 1927, the U.S.S.R. pledged to purchase 50 million rubles annually in
Persian goods. Domke and Hazard, supra note 50, at 57. See generally, Malish, supra
note 35.1, at 29-39. The executive agreement to extend most favored nation status to
the Soviet Union was concluded Aug. 4, 1937, 50 Stat. 1619. It was extended annually until 1942.
62. The President granted most-favored-nation status to Poland by notification to the
Secretary of the Treasury. 25 Fed. Reg. 12501 (1960). The claims settlement is recorded at 11 U.S.T. 1960, T.I.A.S. No. 4545.
63. White House Fact Sheet, Trade Agreement, Lend Lease Settlement, Reciprocal
Credit Arrangements, Joint U.S.-U.S.S.R. Commercial Commission, October 18, 1972.
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In 1964, the United States signed an accord with Ro-

mania for the protection of intangible property rights in technology. 65
As already noted, the political concessions, express or implied, in any
trade agreement constitute an additional and occasionally controlling consideration in any agreement with Communist nations. 66
The October, 1972 trade agreement with the Soviet Union has introduced
several items related to reciprocity questions. Article 3 provides that each

country may take appropriate measures to protect against dumping. 7 Article 4 guarantees that all currency payments will be made in dollars or another freely convertible currency. Article 6 states that there will be no governmental immunity from suit or execution of judgment with respect to
commercial matters, and the same article also assures the availability of
American business facilities in the Soviet Union. A resolution of outstand64. The People's Republic of China does not adhere to the Berne Convention for
the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, the 1952 Universal Copyright Convention, 6 U.S.T. 2731, T.I.A.S. No. 3324, and the 1967 Stockholm Convention, 21
U.S.T. 1583, T.I.A.S. No. 6923.
65. Malish, supra note 36, at 33.
66. In 1964 Secretary of State Rusk gave some insight into the purposes of trade
with Communist countries. He testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
as follows:
In my observations today I have tried to emphasize three points: First,
trade can be a useful instrument of policy in the contest with communism and
in affecting Communist policies, provided it is adapted to the particular
situations presented by different Communist countries....
Second, trading policies suited to one period in our relations with a
particular Communist Country may not be equally appropriate at another
period....
Third, our national purpose can be served either by the denial of trade or
the encouragement of trade, depending on circumstances. Furthermore, the
denial of trade may be either total or selective, again depending on the circumstances ...
Above all, let us avoid the doctrinaire extremes that seem to flourish in
this field ...
On the one hand . . . trade with Communist countries should not be
conducted purely on the basis of commercial considerations and as though
there were no political and military issues dividing East and West....
On the other hand . . . trade with the Communist world cannot be effectively used as a blunt instrument. It must be flexibly adapted and flexibly
applied on the basis of political, military, and economic realities. And this
requires that we make distinctions among Communist countries.
East West Trade, Hearings Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 88th Cong.,
2d Sess. 17-18 (1964).
67. Dumping occurs when goods are sold in the foreign country for a price which
is lower than the goods are sold for in the country of manufacture. This practice is
prohibited by domestic legislation in the United States. Antidumping Act, 42 Stat. 110
(1921), as amended 19 U.S.C. §§ 160-173 (1952). See generally, METZGER, I Law of
International Trade 739-911 (1966).
Article 3 also applies to countervailing duties, Tariff Act of 1930 § 303, 46 Stat. 687, 19 U.S.C. § 1303 (1952), and equalization
duties, 46 Stat. 701, 19 U.S.C. § 1336 (1952).
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ing claims between the two countries, together with these provisions, might
form an important part of any United States-Peoples Republic of China
trade agreement. 6
The Most Favored Nation Clause and A Sino-American Trade Agreement
While the United States would be concerned with securing appropriate
concessions for extending most-favored-nation status, it is likely that Peking,
too, may be unwilling simply to exchange assurances of most-favored-nation
treatment. Indeed, socialist theory rejects the most-favored-nation concept, and China contends that "equal opportunity" to a capitalist market
is a tool to weaken smaller nations. 0
China bases its commercial arrangements, like its political relations, on
the principle of "equality and mutual benefit."' 70 By this is meant an exchange in terms which will be equally beneficial to both countries, or nearly
so, an exchange of what one has for what one lacks without undue economic
advantage to either. This policy helps explain China's practice of importing
71
only that which she is able to finance through exports.
Despite a certain ideological aversion to the most-favored-nation principle, China has, as noted, included such a clause in several trade agreements.
Article 4 of the 1971 trade agreement between Italy and the People's
Republic of China 72 provides a typical example. That provision is tailored
essentially to a market economy, which regulates trade only through tariff
walls or similar restrictions, rather than to a state trading nation which directly controls the purchase and sale of merchandise.
Since the recent American-Soviet trade agreement may serve as a model
for the extension of most-favored-nation status to other Communist countries, the most-favored-nation clause in that agreement merits comparison
with that contained in the agreement between the People's Republic of
China and Italy. Article 1 of the American-Soviet agreement provides:
68. See notes 56 and 57, supra.
69. See Hsiao, supra note 42, at 649-651.
70. On October 1, 1949, Chairman Mao Tse Tung introduced the concept of equality
and mutual benefit in his declaration of principles which were to govern the new nation's foreign policy. ECKSTEIN, CHINA TRADE PROSPECTS AND U.S. POLICY, supra,
note 7 at 128. In a major restatement of China's foreign trade policy, Vice Minister
for Foreign Trade, Chou Hua-min said in a speech before the U.N.C.T.A.D. plenary
meeting in Santiago on April 20, 1972 that: "All countries, regardless of their social
system, should handle their relations with other countries in accordance with the five
principles of mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty, mutual nonagression, non-interference in each others' internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence." China's Principled Stand on Relations of International Economy and Trade, 17 PEKING REVIEW 11, 13 (1972).

71. See Economic Developments in Mainland China, Hearings Before the loint
Economic Comm., 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1972).
72. See supra, note 42.
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1. Each Government shall accord unconditionally to products
originating in or exported to the other country treatment no less
favorable than that accorded to like products originating in or exported to any third country in all matters relating to:
(a) customs duties and charges of any kind imposed on or in
connection with importation or exportation including the method of
levying such duties and charges;
(b) internal taxation, sale, distribution, storage and use;
(c) charges imposed upon the international transfer of payments for importation or exportation; and
(d) rules and formalities in connection with importation or
exportation.
3. Paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article 1 shall not apply to (i) any
privileges which are granted by either Government to neighboring
countries with a view toward facilitating frontier traffic, or (ii)
any preferences granted by either Government in recognition of
Resolution 21 (II) adopted on March 26, 1968 at the Second
UNCTAD, or (iii) any action by either Government which is permitted under any multinational trade agreement to which such
Government is a party on the date of signature of this agreement, if
such agreement would permit such action in similar circumstances
with respect to like products originating in or exported to a country which is a signatory thereof, or (iv) the exercise by either
Government of its rights under Articles 3 or 8 of this agreement. 73
The most-favored-nation provisions of the two treaties are substantially
similar, which suggests that the other provisions of these agreements could
likewise occur in some form in any American-Chinese agreement. Among
such provisions suggested by the non-most-favored-nation subjects contained
in these agreements are provisions for settlement of claims; purchase commitments either from a stated list or for a stated amount of goods; provision
against copyright and patent infringement; a requirement that payment be
made in dollars or freely convertible currency; anti-dumping protection;
provisions disallowing sovereign immunity in disputed commercial transactions; an unrestricted right to use force majeur to protect national interests;
the exchange of individual and corporate trade representatives; access of
legal and natural persons to the domestic courts; and provisions for the
73. The 1972 most-favored-nation provision directly parallels the 1937 provision
between the United States and the Soviet Union. In the 1937 agreement, the U.S.
granted: ". . . unconditional and unrestricted most-favored-nation treatment in all
matters concerning customs duties and charges of every kind and in the method of
levying duties, and, further, in all matters concerning the rules, formalities and charges
imposed in connection with the clearing of goods through the customs, and with respect to all laws or regulations affecting the role or use, of imported goods within the
country." Malish, supra note 36 at 30.
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elimination or modification of remaining obstacles to trade between the
two countries. 74 A reservation taken by the United States with respect to
immigration quotas in the 1946 Friendship, Commerce and Navigation pact
with the Nationalist government should not, of course, be repeated, 75 nor
should the United States seek to accomplish unwieldy political objectives
in such an accord.
Methods of Extending Most Favored Nation Status To China
There are essentially four ways in which the United States might provide
for most-favored-nation tariff treatment on Chinese exports to the U.S.
All require Congressional action. 78 These are (a) amendment of existing
inhibiting legislation to permit the President to extend most-favored-nation
status to China in his discretion, such as by the simple repeal of section 231
of the 1962 Trade Expansion Act; 7" (b) enactment of legislation granting
the President the power to extend most-favored-nation status to countries
currently denied such treatment, including China, such as by passage of a
bill similar to the "East-West Trade Relations Act of 1971 ;,78 (c) enactment
of a statute tailored for China alone and permitting the President, upon the
observance of certain statutory guidelines, to extend most-favored-nation
status to China under the terms of a "China Trade Relations Act; ' 79 or
(d) Executive negotiation of a U.S.-China trade agreement embracing a mostfavored-nation clause and subject to subsequent Congressional approval, as
with the 1972 trade agreement between the United States and the Soviet
Union.
74. See, e.g., Restrictions on fur imports, 19 U.S.C. § 1202 (1970); Meat inspection laws, 19 U.S.C. § 306, 21 U.S.C. §§ 601-695 (1970). For a general summary of
curren trade restrictions, see Battle Act Report for 1971, U.S. State Department Publication 8641; Metzger, Federal Regulation and Prohibitionof Trade with Iron Curtain
Countries, 29 L. & CoNTEMP. PROBs. 1000 (1964); Berman and Garson, United States
Export Controls-Past,Present and Future, 67 COLUM. L. REv. 791 (1967); McQuade,

U.S. Trade with Eastern Europe: Its Prospects and Parameters, 3 L. & POL. INt'L Bus.
42, 71-100 (1971).
75. 63 Stat. 1299, T.I.A.S. No. 1871.
76. The Constitution gives Congress the power to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises, Art. I, § 8, Cl. 2, and to regulate commerce with foreign nations,
Art. I, § 8, Cl. 3. Under Rule XI, Section 21, of the Rules of the House of Representatives, the Committee on Ways and Means has original jurisdiction with respect to
all proposed legislation and related matters concerning, inter alia, reciprocal trade
agreements and revenue measures generally. Rule XXV of the Standing Rules of the
Senate provides that all proposed legislation and related matters affecting revenue
measures, customs, trade agreements, tariffs and import quotas must be referred to the
Senate Committee on Finance. Since "all bills for raising revenue shall originate in

the House of Representatives" U.S. CONST., art. I, § 7, it is traditional that tariff
legislation is not voted upon by the Senate until prior passage by the House.
77. See supra, note 17.
78. S. 2620, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1971).
79. See "Romanian Trade Relations Act," S. 1389, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971),
proposed but never passed.
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Of these alternatives, only (b) and (d) would seem at all possible of
achievement during the 93rd Congress. Repeal of Section 231 is most unlikely in the absence of more comprehensive trade policy changes. There
has never been any serious evident sentiment in Congress for repeal of that
provision by itself, nor would bare repeal provide the kind of guidance to
the President in determining the conditions for extending most-favorednation status which even the most liberal trade legislators have felt important
to include in such bills as the 1971 East-West Trade Relations Act.
Representative William Moorehead (D-Pa.) did attempt a modification of
Section 231 with his H.R. 4716, introduced on February 26, 1973, but
his bill has languished. It would permit trade concessions to products of
Eastern Europe, including the U.S.S.R., but not to China.
Similarly, a "China Trade Relations Act" would doubtless encounter at
least as many obstacles as the Romanian proposal, which languished and
died without hearings or debate in the 92d Congress despite support from the
Administration and sponsorship by a majority of Ways and Means Committee
Members. The cause of China trade has no constituency in the United
States which can remotely match an opposition of organized labor, protectionist industry and aroused anti-Communists.
Should the Nixon Administration enter into diplomatic relations with
China, the prospects for an agreement on trade would naturally be greatly
enhanced and, as with the 1972 American-Soviet agreement, an exchange of
most-favored-nation benefits subject to Congressional approval could form
a part of it. Without diplomatic relations, a trade agreement concluded
between governments-which is the only kind of agreement capable of
embracing a most-favored-nation clause-is nearly an impossibility. It
would be possible only if China, whose interest in recognition transcends
economics, saw such a pact as leading to diplomatic ties, and if the United
States could secure unusually significant concessions.
In the absence of diplomatic relations, then, the best prospects for moving
toward most-favored-nation status for China, as far as U.S. initiatives are
concerned, appears to be passage of legislation designed to give the President authority to conclude trade agreements with nations, including China,
with which we lack State relations.80 This would encourage a dialogue with
the Chinese through existing informal channels preparatory to negotiation of a
80. Such authority was proposed as early as 1965.

See Report to the President of

the Special Committee on U.S. Trade Relations with East European Countries and the
Soviet Union, The White House, April 29, 1965. A complete text on the report appears at Hearings, Joint Economic Comm., supra note 42, at 1147-71. For an example
of a trade agreement concluded in the absence of diplomatic relations, see the text
of the 1958 Sino-Japenese trade accord which appears at 104 Cong. Rec. 6218-19
(April 3, 1958).
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trade agreement. So long as the President lacks such authority, and the
prospect of Congressional undoing of Executive initiatives exists, the Chinese and the Americans are deprived of the incentive to seek a trade policy of
meaningful scope.
For the Congress to grant the President conditional authority to extend mostfavored-nation status does not, of course, require its extension to China. It
does permit, within the guidelines of the legislation proposed, trade negotiation unhampered with the potential of non-trade perils not uncommon in
Congressional consideration. One of these, already mentioned, is the refusal
of the Ways and Means Committee during the 92d Congress to consider
most-favored-nation status for Romania despite the fact that most Committee
Members and the Administration favored passage and that Romania is a
GATT member, with growing trade with the United States which is
chronically unbalanced, pursuing a policy of friendship with the United
States and independence of the Soviet Union. Another example is the troublesome non-trade issue of the Soviet tax on emigrating Jews which has obscured
the merits of the 1972 American-Soviet trade agreement and delayed its effective operation. s 1
Congress does have a legitimate and important interest in the terms of any
foreign trade agreement, particularly so where the other party is a nonmarket country unable to reciprocate in kind trade benefits the United States
can assure with most-favored-nation status. The Congressional interest can
be safeguarded by providing in the statute enabling the President to extend
most-favored-nation status certain guidelines and conditions on the exercise
of that authority. These could include, for example, a limitation on the duration of the agreement, a suggestion of benefits to be obtained, provisions for
suspension or termination of the agreement, and requirements with respect to
Congressional review of the agreements concluded by the President.
Should the United States Extend Most Favored Nation Status to China?
Assuming meaningful concessions can be secured in exchange, there is no
good reason to withhold most-favored-nation tariff treatment from China's
exports. To deny most-favored-nation status to China would be to repeat the
81. On October 4, 1972, Representative Charles Vanik of Ohio introduced, with
the support of seventy co-sponsors, H.R. 17000, a bill to prohibit most favored nation
treatment and other trade benefits to any non-market economy country which denies to
its citizens the right or opportunity to emigrate, or which imposes more than nominal
emigration fees upon its citizens. 118 Cong. Rec. H 9165, (1972).
Companion
legislation, Amendment No. 1691 to S2620, was introduced in the Senate the same day
by Senator Henry Jackson of Washington, who was joined by an overwhelming majority
of seventy-two members of the Senate as co-sponsorers. 118 Cong. Rec. S 16835 et seq.
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unjustified continuation of the American trade embargo which lasted nearly
two decades beyond the point at which it ought to have been ended.
Why should China be considered for most-favored-nation treatment? The
short answer is that there is really no sound basis upon which to exclude
China from such consideration. Most-favored-nation status was withdrawn
in 1951, at the height of the Cold War, as American and Chinese troops faced
each other in active combat in Korea, and even then the grounds for excluding China from trade benefits were more economic than strategic or political. That this policy was continued without a new rationale by the Trade
Expansion Act in 1962 is no good reason for its perpetuation. Indeed, the
United States has conceded the political discrimination involved in the denial of most-favored-nation treatment in connection with the 1972 trade
82
agreement with Soviet Union.
Concern has been expressed in the Congress that improved trade relations
83
with China would bring about dumping or other unfair trade practices,
but protection against such abuses is afforded by other statutory means than
denial to China of access to the American market enjoyed by most countries
of the world. Canada, which has encouraged Chinese exports, has had no
dumping problem and, more importantly, China and the United States would
be certain in any trade agreement to exchange substantially the same pledges
against market disruption as are included in the 1972 American-Soviet agreement.
Another answer to those who fear a flooding of American markets with
Chinese goods is that it would be foolhardy for China to breach any pledge
against market disruption, or to violate any voluntary export restraints or
American anti-dumping laws. To do so would risk the most-favored-nation
benefit after making costly investments in market research, capital and plant
necessary to compete with other, more experienced exporters to the United
States. Likewise, it would jeopardize political gains of equal or even greater
importance.
82. At the press conference announcing the agreement, Secretary of State Rogers,
in answer to a question about the MFN provision, stated that the provision was de-

signed "to eliminate the discrimination that has been involved in our trade with the
Soviet Union" because, he reiterated, "(t)he fact of the matter is that the present
situation discriminates against the Soviet Union . . . because we have had the problem
of lend lease." White House Fact Sheet, Trade Agreement, Lend Lease Settlement,
Reciprocal Credit Arrangements, Joint U.S.-U.S.S.R. Commercial Commission, October 18, 1972, Press Conference, 2.

Since a lend lease settlement agreement had

been reached, Rogers said, "we would like to have the discriminatory tariffs which
have been directed against the Soviet Union removed."
83. See supra, note 64. Senator Strom Thurmond placed in the Congressional Record a resolution unanimously adopted by the South Carolina Legislature memoralizing
the President and the Congress to protect the State's textile industry against Chinese

competition. 118 Cong. Rec., S 10361; Representative William Jennings Bryan Dorn
made the same resolution a matter of record at 118 Cong. Rec. E.6689.
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Most-favored-nation treatment for China is consistent with the commendable policy of treating Peking and Moscow even-handedly, which suggests that American foreign policy objectives are badly served should China
be singled out for discriminatory tariff treatment. A good case could be
made in fact that China, objectively less militarily dangerous to the United
84
States, should receive more liberal concessions than the Soviet Union.
Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield (D-Mont.), in a speech before
the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Study on March 15,
1973, expressed the "hope that Congress will provide authority to negotiate a most-favored-nation arrangement with China along the lines of the
recent agreement with the Soviet Union." He noted that such an agreement
"could be consumated notwithstanding the absence of formal diplomatic
relations." Adding that Congressional reluctance to grant most-favorednation treatment to the Soviet Union was jeopardized by a pending bill
intended to withhold trade concessions with Soviet policy on emigrating
Jews was changed, he said "[t]hat should not deter Congressional action
on most-favored-nation treatment for China. The two situations are not
analogous," he said "and it would be most unfortunate to lose momentum
which has been generated in the Sino-U.S. rapprochement over what is an
unrelated issue in Europe."
On the first day of the 93d Congress, Representative Dominick Daniels
(D-NJ) introduced H.R. 151, a bill to prohibit most-favored-nation treatment and other trade benefits to any nonmarket economy country denying
to its citizens the right to emigrate or imposing more than nominal fees
upon its citizens as a condition of emigration.8 5 To a similar effect, Representative William Green (D-Pa) introduced H. J. Res. 34.86
The powerful Wilber D. Mills, (D-Ark.) Chairman of the House Committee on Ways and Means which has jurisdiction over trade legislation,
co-authored with Representative Charles Vanik (D-Ohio) a "Freedom of
Emigration Act."87T Introduced in February, 1973 and co-sponsored by an
absolute majority of members of the House, the bill had been introduced
late in the 92d Congress in the Senate by Senator Henry M. Jackson (DWash).88 The "Jackson Amendment" as it came to be known was, in
Vanik's words, "designed to restrain trading privileges or 'most-favorednation treatment' with any nation in East-West trade until that country
84. For expressions of this view as early as 1970, see A Foreign Economic Policy
for the 1970's Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Foreign Economic Policy, Joint
Economic Comm., 91st Cong. 2d Sess. Pt. 6, 217, 226. "East-West Economic Relations", December 7, 8, and 9, 1970.
85. Cong. Rec., House, Jan. 3, 1973, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., H 30.
86. Cong. Rec., House, Jan. 3, 1973, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., H 33.
87. On October 3, 1973 the House Ways and Means Committee reported out The
Freedom of Emigration Act, H.R. 10710.
88. Cong. Rec., House, Feb. 7, 1973, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., H 845-851.
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ceases its discriminatory emigration policies." Vanik acknowledged that the
measure most directly affected the Soviet Union for that country's "head
tax" preventing the emigration of Jews. 89 Later in the 93d Congress
Jackson reintroduced his amendment in the Senate. 90 The Mills-Vanik and
Jackson amendments have greatly, if unintentionally, complicated and delayed
Congressional consideration of a comprehensive trade bill and thus the possibility of most-favored-nation tariff treatment for China. That Jackson had

no intention of depriving China of the possibility of most-favored-nation
benefits is evident from his remarks introducing his amendment on April
10, 1973, when he said his proposal was directed at "the Soviet Union
and the countries of Central Europe." 91 Indeed, Jackson had gone quite
beyond the Nixon Administration's China policy in calling for diplomatic
relations between the United States and the People's Republic of China
92
earlier in the year.
In a report to the House of Representatives on his return from Peking, Majority Leader Hale Boggs said he favored appointment of a "Sino-American
Commercial Commission" charged with improving American-Chinese trade
89. Id. at H 845.
90. The "Jackson Amendment", Amendment 79, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., provides
as follows:
"At the end of Title V of the Act, add the following new section:
"EAST-WEST TRADE AND FREEDOM OF EMIGRATION
"Sec. 507, (a) To assure the continued dedication of the United States to fundamental
human rights, and notwithstanding any other provision of this Act or any other law,
after October 15, 1972, no nonmarket economy country shall be eligible to receive
most-favored-nation treatment or to participate in any program of the Government
of the United States which extends credits or credit guarantees or investment guarantees,
directly or indirectly, during the period beginning with the date on which the President
of the United States determines that such country"(1) denies its citizens the right or opportunity to emigrate, or
"(2) imposes more than a nominal tax on emigration or on the visas or other
documents required for emigration, for any purpose or cause whatsoever, or
"(3) imposes more than a nominal tax, levy, fine, fee, or other charge on any
citizen as a consequence of the desire of such citizen to emigrate to the country of
his choice, and ending on the date on which the President determines that such country
is no longer in violation of paragraph (1), (2), or (3).
"(b) After October 15, 1972, a nonmarket economy country may participate in a
program of the Government of the United States which extends credits or credit
guarantees or investment guarantees, and shall be eligible to receive most-favored-nation
treatment, only after the President of the United States has submitted to the Congress
a report indicating that such country is not in violation of paragraph (1), (2), or (3)
of subsection (a). Such report with respect to such country, shall include information
as to the nature and implementation of emigration laws and policies and restrictions
or discrimination applied to or against persons wishing to emigrate. The report
required by this subsection shall be submitted initially as provided herein and semiannually therefore so long as any agreement entered into pursuant to the exercise of
such authority is in effect."
91. Cong. Rec., Senate, April 10, 1973, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. S 6920.
92. The Washington Post, February 5, 1973, p. A 3.
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relations, acknowledging that this raised the question of most-favored-nation treatment for China. 3
In considering the type and volume of trade in the foreseeable future,
there is little likelihood of the United States suffering from political manipulation of trade by China, simply because there is no risk of the United States
becoming dependent upon China either as a supplier or purchaser. Nor, for
the same reason, need China fear political manipulation of United States
trade policy. Finally, there must be a reasonable equilibrium in trade or
China will be without the foreign exchange to continue purchasing American
exports, a fact which recalls the lines of poet Robert Frost: "Before I built
a wall I'd ask to know what I was walling in or walling out."
The ProspectsForMost FavoredNation Treatment For China
It is ironic in view of the extent to which a policy of communist containment
has shaped American economic policy toward China since 1949 that the
more serious opponents to normalized American trade relations with Peking
are likely to argue not that Sino-American trade will menace international
peace or the security of the United States, but that it will jeopardize American jobs.
An example of this sentiment is the protectionist Hartke-Burke legislation first introduced during the 92d Congress, 9 4 and offered again in the 93d.
On January 3, 1973, the opening day of the 93d Congress, Representative
James Burke (D-Mass) reintroduced the Hartke-Burke bill as the "Foreign
Trade and Investment Act of 1973," H.R. 62.9 5 Senator Vance Hartke
introduced the same bill the following day in the Senate as S. 151.90 If
passed, Hartke-Burke would, among other things, impose quotas on virtually
all imports, provide new and more speedily imposed dumping penalties, and
authorize the President to prohibit the export of American technology.
Products with foreign components would, under the bill, be required to be
labeled to that effect, and advertising of such goods would have to disclose
not only the component, but the foreign nation in which it was produced.
93. 118 Cong. Rec., 7660-64 (1972). Boggs had elaborated this proposal in a statement to the Joint Economic Committee, infra note 43, at 143-48. Since the Boggs

proposal, a "National Council for the U.S.-China Trade" has, with U.S. Government
encouragement, been formed in Washington, D.C.
94. S. 151 and H.R. 62. Ways and Means Committee Chairman Wilbur D.
Mills (D-Ark.) is on record in opposition to this legislation as "devastating" in scope.
Interview with Der Spiegel, Sept. 11, 1972, 102, unofficial translation from German by
the Congressional Research Service of the Library of Congress. In the 93rd Congress
the House Ways and Means Committee is presently holding hearings on H.R. 6767,
the Nixon administration proposal. 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1972).
95. Cong. Rec., House, Jan. 3, 1973, H 28, 93d Cong., 1st Sess.
96. Cong. Rec., Senate, Jan. 4, 1973, S 31, 93d Cong., Ist Sess.
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Present law permitting foreign assembly of American products for shipment
back to the United States and dutiable only on a value added basis would
be repealed.
With strong support from organized labor, Hartke-Burke or legislation similarly conceived could play havoc with consideration of trade legislation,
particularly with legislation embodying the possibility of increased imports
from China. The adverse effect of foreign competition on labor-intensive
sectors of the economy has greatly sensitized Congress to appeals for protection of American industries and jobs. 97 The danger to legislation designed
to authorize Presidential grant of most-favored-nation status is not only that
it may be supplanted with more restrictive legislation, but that, even if passed,
it may be fatally encumbered with inhibiting amendments.
In addition to opposition on economic grounds, there remains potential
opposition to improved trade relations with China on political and ideological grounds. Pressure on Congress by groups traditionally hostile to Peking is likely to occur whenever Congress takes up legislation permitting the
extension of trade benefits to China, though such efforts have lost their bite.
Among these groups is the "Committee of One Million" which emerged to
oppose improved political relations with Peking and which includes among
its steering committee members Senate Minority Leader Hugh Scott, Senator
Peter Dominick of the Committee on Armed Services, Rep. Thomas Morgan,
Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, and Rep. Clement
Zablocki, Chairman of the National Security Subcommittee of the House
Foreign Affairs Committee.
Despite likely opposition, however, encouragement might be taken from
the fact that Senate Minority Leader Scott, on his return from a visit to
China, suggested in June, 1972 that most-favored-nation status for China
was premature only because it ought first to be extended with better reason
to other nations and that its extension to China might follow conclusion of
the war in Vietnam. 98 With the end of the Indochina war, and the 1972
agreement to extend most-favored-nation status to the Soviet Union, it appears
close to the time when most-favored-nation status for China will enjoy Congressional support.
In the end, it will be national self-interest which determines American trade
97. Both the Democratic and Republican Platforms, adopted in 1972 pledge vigorous action to protect American jobs from foreign competition, particularly from low
wage nations. The AFL-CIO Executive Council went on record on August 2, 1973
in opposition to H.R. 6767 and in favor of the Burke-Hartke bill. Representative
Burke, calling the administration's trade bill one that "will cost thousands of working
men their jobs," placed the AFL-CIO statement in the congressional record. 119 Cong.
Rec. H. 7468 (daily ed. Aug. 3, 1973).
98. Economic Developments in Mainland China, supra note 69, at 22,
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policy toward China, and, for a nation seeking new markets and recognizing
that concessions will be required to obtain them, most-favored-nation status
for China will be both logical and necessary. Senator James Pearson, a
Republic of Kansas, expressed this awakened interest in China trade in the
closing days of the 92d Congress: "I don't want to be cynical of my constituency, but I notice my wheat farmers become much more tolerant of
national philosophies and ideologies when there is a chance to sell more
wheat. 99

99. Id. at 26.
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APPENDIX I
"TITLE V-TRADE RELATIONS WITH COUNTRIES NOT
ENJOYING MOST-FAVORED-NATION
TARIFF TREATMENT*
"SEC. 501. EXCEPTION OF THE PRODUCTS OF CERTAIN COUNTRIES OR AREAS.
"(a) Except as otherwise provided in this title, the President shall continue to deny most-favored-nation treatment to the products of any country
or area, the products of which were not eligible for column 1 tariff treatment
on the date of enactment of this Act.
"(b) The President is authorized to deny such most-favored-nation treatment to all of the products of any country or area if in his judgment such
action is necessary for reasons of national security.
"SEC. 502. AUTHORITY TO ENTER INTO COMMERCIAL AGREEMENTS.
"(a) Subject to the provision of subsections (b) and (c) of this section,
the President may authorize the entry into force of bilateral commercial
agreements providing most-favored-nation treatment to the products of
countries heretofore denied such treatment whenever he determines that
such agreements with such countries will promote the purposes of this Act
and are in the national interest.
"(b) Any such bilateral commercial agreement shall(1) be limited to an initial period specified in the agreement which
shall be no more than three years from the time the agreement enters
into force, except that it may be renewable for additional periods, each
not to exceed three years, provided a satisfactory balance of trade concessions has been maintained during the life of each agreement and
provided further that the President determines that actual or foreseeable
reductions in United States tariffs and nontariffs barriers to trade resulting from multilateral negotiations are satisfactorily reciprocated by the
other party to a bilateral commercial agreement with the United States;
(2) provide that it is subject to suspension or termination at any
time for national security reasons, or that the other provisions of such
agreement shall not limit the rights of any party to take any action
for he protection of its security interests; and
(3) provide for consultations for the purpose of reviewing the
operation of the agreement and relevant aspects of relations between
the United States and the other party.
"(c) (1) An agreement referred to in subsection (a) or an order referred
to in section 504(a) shall take effect only after the expiration of 90 days
* A useful summary of and reference to testimony before the Committee on Ways
and Means on Title V of H.R. 6767 appears in Part 15 of Trade Reform, Hearings before

the Committee on Ways and Means, House of Rep., 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 5267-76.
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from the date on which the President delivers a copy of such agreement or
order to the Senate and to the House of Representatives, if between the date
of delivery of the agreement or order to the Senate and to the House of
Representatives and the expiration of the 90-day period neither the Senate
nor the House of Representatives has adopted a resolution, by an affirmative
vote by the yeas and nays of a majority of the authorized membership of that
House, stating that it disapproves of the agreement or order.
"(2) For purposes of this subsection, there shall be excluded from the
computation of the 90-day period the days on which either House is not in
session because of an adjournment of more than three days to a day certain
or an adjournment of Congress sine die. The agreement referred to in subsection (a) or order referred to in section 504(a) shall be delivered to both
Houses of the Congress on the same day and shall be delivered to the Clerk
of the House of Representatives if the House of Representatives is not in
session and to the Secretary of the Senate if the Senate is not in session.
"SEC. 503. ADDITIONAL PROVISIONS.
"(a) Bilateral commercial agreements under this title may in addition
include provisions concerning:
(1) safeguard arrangements necessary to prevent disruption of
domestic markets;
(2) arrangements for the protection of industrial rights and processes, trademarks and copyrights;
(3) arrangements for the settlement of commercial differences and
disputes;
(4) arrangements for the promotion of trade including those for
the establishment or expansion of trade and tourist promotion offices,
for facilitation of activities of governmental commercial officers, participation in trade fairs and exhibits and the sending of trade missions,
and for facilitation of entry, establishment and travel of commercial
representatives; and
(5) such other arrangements of a commercial nature as will promote
the purposes of this Act.
"(b) Nothing in this section shall be deemed to affect domestic law.
"SEC. 504. EXTENSION OF MOST-FAVORED-NATION TREATMENT.
"(a) The President may extend most-favored-nation treatment to the
products of a foreign country which (1) has entered into a bilateral commercial agreement and such agreement has entered into force pursuant to
section 502, or (2) has become a party to an appropriate multilateral trade
agreement to which the United States is also a party, and the President has
issued an order extending such treatment, which order has taken effect pursuant to section 502(c).
"(b) The application of most-favored-nation treatment shall be limited
to the period of effectiveness of the obligations of the United States to such
country under such bilateral commercial agreement or multilateral agreement.
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"(c) The President may at any time suspend or withdraw any extension
of most-favored-nation treatment to any country pursuant to subsection (a),
and thereby cause all products of such country to be dutiable at the column 2
rate.
"SEC. 505. MARKET DISRUPTION.
"(a) A petition may be filed or a Tariff Commission investigation otherwise initiated under section 201 of this Act in respect of imports of an article
manufactured or produced in a country, the products of which are receiving
most-favored-nation treatment pursuant to this title, in which case the
Tariff Commission shall determine (in lieu of the determination described
in section 201(b) of this Act) whether imports of such article produced in
such country are causing or are likely to cause material injury to a domestic
industry producing like or directly competitive articles, and whether a condition of market disruption (within the meaning of section 201 (f) (2) of this
Act) exists with respect to such imports.
"(b) For the purposes of sections 202 and 203 of this Act, an affirmative
determination of the Tariff Commission pursuant to subsection (a) of this
section shall be treated as an affirmative determination of the Tariff Commission pursuant to section 201(b) of this Act, provided, however, that the
President, in taking action pursuant to section 203 (a) (1) of this Act, may
adjust imports of the article from the country in question without taking action
in respect of imports from other countries.
"SEC. 506. EFFECTS ON OTHER LAWS.
"The President shall from time to time reflect in general headnote 3(e)
of the Tariff Schedules of the United States the provisions of this title and
actions taken hereunder, as appropriate."
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APPENDIX II
PETTIS-CORMAN FORMULA
The President may extend, or continue to extend, most-favored-nation
treatment to the products of any state trading country only if he finds"(1)
that the agreement under which the most-favored-nation treatment is being extended will result in a satisfactory balance in trade concessions, and that the treatment to be accorded United States products
by such country is as advantageous as the treatment such country extends
to the products of other countries extending nondiscriminatory treatment to such country;
"(2)
that the agreement contains provisions with respect to safeguard arrangements necessary to prevent disruption of domestic markets
and that such provisions, together with United States laws governing
practices with respect to imports, are being administered in such a manner as to prevent material injury to domestic producing interests competing with the products of state trading nations which material injury
results from conditions in their labor markets, including the absence
of a free labor market based upon reasonable choice of the labor regarding his employment and the opportunity to bargain collectively on the
terms and conditions of work;
"(3)
in an annual report to the Congress, that such nation is evidencing reasonable progress in the observance of internationally agreed
upon principles of human rights (including the rights of freedom of
emigration and free expression of ideas). The annual report required
by this paragraph shall, with respect to any country, include information
as to the nature and implementation of emigration laws and policies,
and restrictions or discrimination applied to or against persons wishing
to emigrate; and
"(4)
that the initial agreement under which the most-favored-nation
treatment is being extended is for a period of not more than three
years, and that such agreement may be extended (for a period of not
more than three years at any one time) only if the President recommends, and the Congress concurs, in such extension. If at any time the
President finds that it is in the national security interest to terminate any
such agreement with a state trading nation, he shall do so. In addition
if, during the 90 days following any annual report, either House of
Congress finds that any of the above conditions have not been met,
that House can by majority vote veto the extension of Most Favored
Nation treatment.

